• Unlike all the countries of the Arab World, Iraq enjoys a unique situation: it has the three main ingredients that can transform any country into a paradise. It has water, money, and manpower, and plenty of all three. That makes Iraq's potential unmatched in the Arab World. If we take Egypt, for instance, it has manpower; it has water, with a caveat, however, since the water is unevenly distributed; but it does not have money. If we look at Saudi Arabia, it (still) has money and practically nothing else.

• Having all three elements is necessary for "making it": (1) the water from the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, in addition to hundreds of canals dug between the two rivers and beyond as well other smaller rivers; (2) the manpower since it has a population of 20 million with high level of education; and finally (3) the money in the billions from its oil resources. Having all this, Iraq can be a regional power, and more importantly, it can have an independent political will and an independent foreign policy.

• Independent political will, however, is unacceptable to the West and especially to the U.S. I am not blaming the West, for it is looking after its own interests. It is up to the Arab countries to look after their own interests. One does not need to be a genius to figure out what the U.S. interests are: to be able to dominate the area because of its strategic importance; oil supplies must be secured at the cheapest price possible; and the money spent on buying oil must be recovered by whatever means, selling weapons for instance. To achieve that, we see an Arab head of state like Saddam Hussein being cultivated and maintained in power. The same is true for the rest of the Arab leaders.

• After the Iran-Iraq war was over (1988), the devaluation of the Dinar started. The rate of exchange used to be ID (Iraqi Dinar) 1 = $3.3. Just before the Gulf War (Jan 91) the rate was ID 1 = $1. In July 91: $1 = ID 6; Jan 94: $1 = 60; Mar 94: $1 = 150; Jan 95: $1 = 900. When I arrived in May 95 the rate was $1 = 1,100. When I left in Nov. 95, it was $1 = 2,600. It seem that the trend will continue. There is, however, an official rate of exchange which has not changed for a long time, it is $1 = ID 600.

• By the end of 92 beginning 93, Iraq shifted from the Swiss Dinars (that is, Dinars printed in Switzerland) to the Iraqi Dinars (printed locally). The Swiss Dinars are now exclusively used in the Kurdish areas in the North. The value of the Swiss and the Iraqi Dinars are not the same. The last time I've been in the North, in July 95, 1 Swiss Dinar equaled around 35 Iraqi Dinars.

• Because of the low value of the dinar in relation to the dollar, those who trade with large amount of money can't spend hours counting the dinars, instated they use the scale. They weigh the dinars instead of counting them.

• Another interesting thing. If the value of the dollar, let's say, is ID 1,000 they will give you a little bit more if you accept  25 dinars bills instead of 250 dinars bills which is the largest. Some people would sell their 250 bills for 25 bills to make a profit.

• When liquidity was high because of money printing, fictitious investment companies were set up. They offered 75% interest on the capital. People rushed to deposit their money; then the government closed them down. There are people who lost their fortunes in these deals because some of them sold their properties in order to invest in these fictitious companies, that the government created to siphon the liquidity available.

• In August 95, one egg costed ID 150; 1 liter of Gas 200 fils (1 Dinar = 1000 fils) (the cheapest things in Iraq are gas and electricity); 1 kg of meat over 3,000, of sugar 1,300; of rice 1,200; of flour 900; one loaf 35 to 90; cooking oil 2,800 the liter.

• Life is getting more and more difficult every day, with the devaluation of the dinar which causes the increase of prices of every commodity. The trend now is not to leave any savings in dinars. People exchange their earnings in dollars to maintain the purchasing power of their earnings, which creates a heavy demand on the dollar which in turn drives down the value of the dinar.

• The average salary in Iraq right now is ID 5,000. Pensions are laughable. One told me that his pension consists of ID 500 every three months. One day I was waiting for a taxi, a private car stopped for me. The owner was using it as a taxi. The government knows that but turns a blind eye. He told me that his pension was ID 300 a month.

• The road network around Baghdad is very elaborate. It is said that it was built during the 70s with the help of the Germans; interchanges, overpasses, underpasses give you the impression that you are not in a developing country.

• Traffic signs are clear and well done; they seem to have adopted the French system: blue signs for expressways with controlled access, green signs for major highways, and white signs for local traffic.

• Traffic inside cities is, however, worse than in any other country. Not only do drivers ignore any traffic rules such as turn signals or driving within lanes, something pretty common in the Middle East, but they also do not respect red lights, something that I have never seen in any other country. I was told that such a breakdown in law and order occurred after the Gulf War. One would have expected more traffic accidents than what it actually happens.

• Baghdad is built horizontally. Most Iraqis live in houses like in the U.S. Apartment buildings do not exceed three, maximum four stories. That's why the area of Baghdad, by Middle East standards, is huge 20x20 miles. A car is practically a must. Taxis however are plentiful but without meters which means you have to bargain every time before you get on. The average trip will cost between ID 300 and 500. Tall buildings, however, can be found in the Karkh area, which is the new part of Baghdad.

• No maps are available. An old tourist map dating from the eighties for the city of Baghdad and its outskirts published in Britain was given to the UN people. Detailed maps for Iraq were provide by U.S. government.

• The most popular car in Iraq is Volkswagen Passat, called Brazili (Brazilian). The reason is Brazil conditioned its sales of weaponry to Iraq on a deal of Passat cars assembled in Brazil. This is how Passat came to be known in Iraq as Brazili.

• Check points are numerous inside the city, and they are found without exception on all roads just before exiting or entering any city. While UN cars are not even stopped, Iraqi cars have to stop and IDs are checked. I noticed that the check points are stricter at the entrance of Karbala, a Shiite holy city.

• I don't think I've seen so many flat tires in my life as I have seen in Baghdad. The main reason for this phenomenon is the price of the new tire which is ID 100,000. Car owners will delay buying a new tires as long as they can.

 

• Living conditions are difficult. The cost of living is very high in comparison with the wages or pensions. Surprisingly, water in some neighborhood is rationed, purification process is not effective people boil the water before drinking it.

• People are more or less resigned to their fate. Because of lack of freedom there are no competitions, no initiatives. Iraqis seem to live day by day, struggling to make ends meet, taking more than one job to be able to feed their children.

• Children sits all-day long behind makeshift tables selling cigarettes; or you find them begging at intersections. Begging is a totally  new phenomenon that was never seen before in Iraq.

• The middle class is disappearing if it has not already disappeared. What is left are the very rich and the very poor and a lower middle class

• From rows and rows of villas one can tell that Iraqis, generally speaking, were living a comfortable life. Presently, however, child labor is a problem in Iraq. As far as international labor laws are concerned, this is of course unacceptable. When this is pointed out to the Iraqis, the answer invariably is that the children are helping their parents. Obviously the economic pressure is forcing children to go to work at an early age

• People are so discouraged that they are losing any hope that any improvement will ever occur anytime soon. Anyone who is able to leave the country legally or illegally is doing so. A wave of emigration is reaching unprecedented levels even though it costs a lot to just have a passport issued. Every passport costs ID 200,000 and the rate will probably go up soon following the dollar. I know of families that had to pay close to one million Iraqi dinars to have a passport issued for each family member. Many Iraqis have to sell their furniture, their car, their jewelery to raise such kind of money. They willingly do it if they do not intend to return. The main destinations for the Iraqis who are emigrating are New Zealand, Australia and Canada.

• People's properties are losing value with the devaluation of the Dinar because there are limits to the increase to which an item can reach. For instance, I was told by an Iraqi that he bought some ten years ago when the Iraqi Dinar was equivalent to $3.3 a refrigerator which cost him $800, the equivalent was ID 242. Today, those $800 equal ID 2 million. Nobody is willing to pay that kind of money for a refrigerator.

• Crimes, prostitution, armed robberies, even by policemen are on the increase. It is not surprising to hear in the middle of the night sounds of gunfire. Tires can be stolen from parked cars. Gas cylinders can be stolen from the house if they are left in the backyard. Shops are broken into and money is stolen from the cashiers. While the regime's main concern is to survive and remain in power the people are left defenseless against the criminals.

• What is terrible after five years of sanctions is that people adjust to them. After a while a point is reached that life with sanctions seems to be natural.  Children who were five when the sanctions were imposed are now ten years old. If the sanctions are maintained, those children who grew up under the sanctions and who have seen nothing else but sanctions will see this as the natural way of life. The abnormal situation is being normalized. A change in the fabrics of Iraqi society is taking place in front of our own eyes. This can have terrible consequences for the country. To reverse the situation will be very difficult and will take a long time.

• A crime is being perpetrate against a whole people just to keep the sanctions going. The criminal in this instance is of course Saddam Hussein who is totally ignoring the plight of his people. He is not, however, the only one. Those who are imposing the sanctions share the responsibility. Because while the declared objective of the sanctions might very well be directed at a tyrant they essentially hit his victims. Saddam Hussein is not suffering from the sanctions, he is still constructing palaces. The people of Iraq are the victims.

• If the Arab world is penetrated, in the sense that intelligence gathering in these states is done covertly, in the case of Iraq this activity is done overtly under the pretext of monitoring. In a sense, intelligence activity in Iraq has been legalized and legitimized. The UN is undertaking a meticulous inventory of all what Iraq had (because Iraqis have destroyed a lot of their equipment just before UNSCOM was started working), has or will have (like all the new contracts for armaments being concluded through Jordanian middle men). Every piece of equipment that can be suspected to have dual use is immediately inventoried and if necessary tagged. Even equipment used in university laboratories are subject to such treatment.

• Also, cameras are installed and more are being installed all the time at all sensitive sites, factories, plants to monitor on a continuous basis every movement or activity. These cameras are connected to video tape recorders. Monitoring teams go regularly to those sites to replace the tapes and bring the used ones to the Center to be viewed.

• Inspectors are doing their job as meticulously as possible. They don't concern themselves with the full picture. They probably don't know that there is a full picture. They don't know that there is an overall policy and that they are the instruments of this policy. In short, they don't ask themselves in what way what they are doing fits with the overall policy and what this policy is.

• In his article in the New York Times of September 17, 1995, Thomas Friedman argues that all Saddam's neighbors want him to remain in power. Syria because a new regime in Iraq will probably be accommodating to the West and the U.S. which will isolate Syria and put the country under more pressure. Egypt because Iraq can be a real competitor for Egyptian primacy in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia (and the Gulf countries in general) because Iraq will start selling oil which will cut into their quotas. Iran because a new regime will leave Iran as the only "pariah" state in the neighborhood. Not surprisingly, Friedman remained silent about the U.S. intentions. Without Saddam, it would have been difficult to impose the embargo, the no-fly zones, the sanctions that compel Iraq to destroy its own military capabilities and reveal the secrets of its chemical and biological warfare programs. Without Saddam, the Gulf rulers would not have to listen to American advice in their oil policies and arms purchases. Without Saddam, the U.S. would not have any justification to be militarily present in the Gulf area.

• In early 1990, the U.S. had 450 military personnel assigned to the Gulf area. Today, some 20,000 men and women, nearly 200 warplanes and more than 20 warships are present in the area. On board of those ships some 100 Tomahawk missiles. Without Saddam, how can the US convince the Gulf states to purchase American arms. Saudi Arabia alone bought $24.7 billion in US weaponry from 1991 to 1993. Thousands of American defense industry jobs now depend on these countries receiving sufficient oil revenues to pay for their purchases. In fact, there are now U.S. weaponry systems that are being made solely for export, including F-15E fighter-bombers, M1A2 Abrams battle tanks, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and the Patriot air defense missile. In light of the above, does the US really want to get rid of Saddam? (Figures taken from Carl Murphy's article which appeared in the Washington Post of July 30, 1995)

• The U.S. has been controlling Saudi oil since the 1930s. Iraq has the second largest oil reserve in the world. If somehow it can succeed in controlling Iraqi oil too, it will have succeeded in controlling two major sources of oil in the world.

• Average Iraqis ask me when will the sanctions be lifted. My answer invariably is as follows: it will be lifted when there will be a change in the elements of the equation. Take for instance the no-war no-peace situation that used to prevail in the Middle East after the 1967 war. It was only when the 1973 war changed the elements of the equation between Egypt and Israel that some kind of movement became possible. Take also the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. There was a status quo between 1967 and 1987. Israel was happy with the situation. The settlements flourished while there was a total apathy on the part of the Palestinians. The intifada changed the elements of the equation and made the peace process possible. The same is true with Iraq. Sanctions will be renewed indefinitely as long as there is no change in the elements of the equation.

• The United States keeps saying that it has no quarrel with the Iraqi people but with Saddam. The purpose of the embargo is to punish Saddam. The fallacy of this position becomes clear when you see that it is the Iraqi people that is punished not Saddam. Both the gulf war and the sanctions are immoral because they sacrificed a civilian population for economic interests. Iraqis are caught between an immoral dictator and an immoral superpower ready to sacrifice a whole population for oil.

Is  UNSCOM an independent UN organ? The US media answered this question.
U.N. Weapon Inspectors Gave Briefings on Iraq, Wall Street Journal, Februay 11, 1998
Israel Gave Key Help To U.N. Team in Iraq, Washington Post, September 29, 1998
Extract from the CNN progam Crossfire, aired November 12, 1998
Report by Jamie McIntyre, CNN Military Affairs Correspondent, aired November 13, 1998
 

Jordan's Role

• Jordan is considered to be the lung with which Iraq breathes. Every conceivable commodity is available in Baghdad through Jordan. One can observe long trucks with trailers on Baghdad expressways. No shortages can be observed in the country. Jordan is taking advantage of the situation

• The traffic between Iraq and Jordan is considerable since this is the only way for anyone Iraqi or non-Iraqi to get in or out of the country. Busses, taxis, private cars do the journey, a distance of 650 km in Iraq and 350 km in Jordan, that takes some 15 hours instead of the 10 hours because of the checkpoints.

• Travelers at the border between Iraq and Jordan are searched meticulously by border police. Birth certificates, school or college diplomas and any other documents of that nature if found are immediately confiscated. Every Iraqi leaving the country is allowed to take with him $50. Anything that is found on him that exceeds this amount is also confiscated. I know of a family that had some $500 dollars confiscated at the border.

• Traveling to the border by car or taxi is an ordeal. Not so much because of the distance. The road from Baghdad to the Jordanian border is an excellent expressway. The problem is with the check points. There are scores of them and at every check point travelers have to give away all kind of goods to be able to continue their journey. A lady traveling by taxi on its way to Baghdad was explicitly asked to give away half of what she was transporting in the trunk.

• In spite of the Muslim religious programs shown on TV or broadcast on the radio, a new phenomenon in Iraq after the Gulf War, Christians in Iraq are very much free to worship, to organize and to have their own activities without interference. No perceptible discrimination against Christians can be noticed in Iraq. There are Christians in high office in the government and in the party. Lately, a Christian was appointed Minister of Housing and Reconstruction. Tarek Aziz himself is Christian.

• Iraqi Christians used to be concentrated in the north around the area of Mosul. Because of the intra-fighting between the Kurds and retaliation by each faction on the Christian population for being accused to help the other side, the Christians fled the north and came to Baghdad.

• Let us take the Chaldeans, since they constitute the majority of Christians in Iraq. They used to have 5 or 6 parishes in Baghdad. The pastor of one the parishes told me that they are now about 30 parishes because of the exodus from the north.

• While the number of Christians in Baghdad has increased, it doesn't mean however that the overall number of Iraqi Christians is also increasing. On the contrary, there is another Christian exodus from Iraq altogether.

• How people are coping with this situation? I put this question to the pastor of a Chaldean parish. He told me that people cannot survive without help from outside Iraq. As far as the Christians are concerned, there is a large Chaldean community in the Detroit metropolitan area. They regularly send money to their relatives in Iraq. One hundred dollar bill can make a difference. The other solution is emigration. Christian presence in Iraq, one of the oldest in church history, is threatened if the economic crisis accompanied by the embargo continues.

• The same pastor of the Chaldean church who had just returned from a summer visit to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan told me that Christian Iraqi communities started to form in these countries. Many of those who went to Turkey fled the country by crossing the border through the northern Kurdish town of Zakho without any identification papers. They live a miserable life there. Those who went to Jordan encounter also many difficulties. Only those who went to Lebanon were able to manage thanks to the help provided by the Christian Lebanese communities. The number of Iraqi Christians in each community is about 5 to 6 thousands in each country.

• Out of a 20 million Iraqis, Christians constitute less than a million. The largest community is the Chaldean, which counts about 600,000. The smallest is the Greek Catholic with only some 30 families. The Greek Orthodox are about 400 families. Armenians are about 20,000.