Santayana's revengeś

Santayana's revengeś

INDEX TERMS War|Bosnia, military history lesson;Bosnia & Hercegovina|military history lesson

DATE 22-Jul-95

WORDS 338

MILITARY history contains troves of accumulated experience to guide United Nations commanders in Bosnia. Among the lessons:
Air superiority is not a sufficient condition for military victory. American B-52 bombers could not dislodge North Vietnamese guerrillas from their bolt-holes. Soviet attack helicopters provided target practice for the mujahideen in Afghanistan. In offensive actions in Bosnia, the West has relied exclusively on NATO air strikes.
Garrisons will fall. It is supply lines that are critical. From the Alamo to Dien Bien Phu (a French garrison in Vietnam), isolated pockets of resistance will be crushed eventually. The 'safe areas' of Bosnia are not safe without supply lines.
Political defeats can be as important as lost battles. The world remembers the Tet offensive, an attack by the North Vietnamese army on South Vietnamese and American positions, as a victory by the North. In fact, tactically, the laurels went to America - decisively. However, the offensive shattered America's confidence in its ability to win the war. The Bosnian Serbs' continued political humiliation of the West creates its own momentum, by making others less willing to trust the West in future. That damages the West.
A local army - even poorly armed - can cripple a better-armed foreign one, unless the invaders act ruthlessly. This, one of the oldest military dicta, has had to be relearned again and again: by the British during the American Revolution, by the French and Americans in Vietnam, and by the Russians in Afghanistan. Though the 20,000 United Nations' troops are not only outnumbered by the Bosnian Serbs but also lightly armed, no one should assume that merely giving them heavy weapons would necessarily be enough.
Last, and most important:

Confused objectives mean confused strategy. Clausewitz said that warfare is a continuation of politics; if the political goal is muddy, the military one will be as well. America's defeat in Vietnam and the allied offensive into North Korea during the Korean war are examples of confused politics. On the bright side, UNPROFOR hasn't marched on Moscow in winter.
© 1995 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved

			Santayana's revengeś

	INDEX TERMS		War\|Bosnia, military history lesson;Bosnia & Hercegovina\|military history lesson
	DATE		22-Jul-95
	WORDS		338

			MILITARY history contains troves of accumulated experience to guide United Nations commanders in Bosnia. Among the lessons: Air superiority is not a sufficient condition for military victory. American B-52 bombers could not dislodge North Vietnamese guerrillas from their bolt-holes. Soviet attack helicopters provided target practice for the mujahideen in Afghanistan. In offensive actions in Bosnia, the West has relied exclusively on NATO air strikes. Garrisons will fall. It is supply lines that are critical. From the Alamo to Dien Bien Phu (a French garrison in Vietnam), isolated pockets of resistance will be crushed eventually. The 'safe areas' of Bosnia are not safe without supply lines. Political defeats can be as important as lost battles. The world remembers the Tet offensive, an attack by the North Vietnamese army on South Vietnamese and American positions, as a victory by the North. In fact, tactically, the laurels went to America - decisively. However, the offensive shattered America's confidence in its ability to win the war. The Bosnian Serbs' continued political humiliation of the West creates its own momentum, by making others less willing to trust the West in future. That damages the West. A local army - even poorly armed - can cripple a better-armed foreign one, unless the invaders act ruthlessly. This, one of the oldest military dicta, has had to be relearned again and again: by the British during the American Revolution, by the French and Americans in Vietnam, and by the Russians in Afghanistan. Though the 20,000 United Nations' troops are not only outnumbered by the Bosnian Serbs but also lightly armed, no one should assume that merely giving them heavy weapons would necessarily be enough. Last, and most important: Confused objectives mean confused strategy. Clausewitz said that warfare is a continuation of politics; if the political goal is muddy, the military one will be as well. America's defeat in Vietnam and the allied offensive into North Korea during the Korean war are examples of confused politics. On the bright side, UNPROFOR hasn't marched on Moscow in winter. © 1995 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved